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In the opening words of his Principles, Alfred Marshall proclaimed eco-
nomics to be a psychological science.
Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of
life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely
connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of
wellbeing.
Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more
important side, a part of the study of man. For man’s character has been moulded
by his every-day work, and the material resources which he thereby procures, more
than by any other influence unless it be that of his religious ideals.
In its actual development, however, economic science has focused on
just one aspect of Man’s character, his reason, and particularly on the
application of that reason to problems of allocation in the face of scarcity.
Still, modern definitions of the economic sciences, whether phrased in
terms of allocating scarce resources or in terms of rational decision mak-
ing, mark out a vast domain for conquest and settlement. In recent years
there has been considerable exploration by economists even of parts of this
domain that were thought traditionally to belong to the disciplines of
political science, sociology, and psychology.
DECISION THEORY AS ECONOMIC SCIENCE
The density of settlement of economists over the whole empire of econom-
ic science is very uneven, with a few areas of modest size holding the bulk
of the population. The economic Heartland is the normative study of the
international and national economies and their markets, with its triple
main concerns of full employment of resources, the efficient allocation of
resources, and equity in distribution of the economic product. Instead of
the ambiguous and over-general term “economics,” I will use “political
economy” to designate this Heartland, and “economic sciences” to denote
the whole empire, including its most remote colonies. Our principal con-
cern in this paper will be with the important colonial territory known as
decision theory. I will have something to say about both its normative and
descriptive aspects, and particularly about its applications to the theory of
* I am indebted to Albert Ando, Otto A. Davis, and Benjamin M Friedman for valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this Paper.344 Economic Sciences 1978
the firm. It is through the latter topic that the discussion will be linked back
to the Heartland of political economy.
Underpinning the corpus of policy-oriented normative economics, there
is, of course, an impressive body of descriptive or “positive” theory which
rivals in its mathematical beauty and elegance some of the finest theories in
the physical sciences. As examples I need only remind you of Walrasian
general equilibrium theories and their modern descendants in the works
of Henry Schultz, Samuelson, Hicks, and others; or the subtle and impres-
sive body of theory created by Arrow, Hurwicz, Debreu, Malinvaud, and
their colleagues showing the equivalence, under certain conditions, of
competitive equilibrium with Pareto optimality.
The relevance of some of the more refined parts of this work to the real
world can be, and has been, questioned. Perhaps some of these intellectual
mountains have been climbed simply because they were there - because of
the sheer challenge and joy of scaling them. That is as it should be in any
human scientific or artistic effort. But regardless of the motives of the
climbers, regardless of real-world veridicality, there is no question but that
positive political economy has been strongly shaped by the demands of
economic policy for advice on basic public issues.
This too is as it should be. It is a vulgar fallacy to suppose that scientific
inquiry cannot be fundamental if it threatens to become useful, or if it
arises in response to problems posed by the everyday world. The real
world, in fact, is perhaps the most fertile of all sources of good research
questions calling for basic scientific inquiry.
Decision Theory in the Service of Political Economy
There is, however, a converse fallacy that deserves equal condemnation:
the fallacy of supposing that fundamental inquiry is worth pursuing only if
its relevance to questions of policy is immediate and obvious. In the
contemporary world, this fallacy is perhaps not widely accepted, at least as
far as the natural sciences are concerned. We have now lived through
three centuries or more of vigorous and highly successful inquiry into the
laws of nature. Much of that inquiry has been driven by the simple urge to
understand, to find the beauty of order hidden in complexity. Time and
again, we have found the “idle” truths arrived at through the process of
inquiry to be of the greatest moment for practical human affairs. I need
not take time here to argue the point. Scientists know it, engineers and
physicians know it, congressmen and members of parliaments know it, the
man on the street knows it.
But I am not sure that this truth is as widely known in economics as it
ought to be. I cannot otherwise explain the rather weak and backward
development of the descriptive theory of decision making including the
theory of the firm, the sparse and scattered settlement of its terrain, and
the fact that many if not most of its investigators are drawn from outside
economics - from sociology,  from psychology, and from political science.
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Machlup, and Milton Friedman, for example - have placed it outside the
Pale (more accurately, have placed economics outside its Pale), and have
offered it full autonomy provided that it did not claim close kinship with
genuine economic inquiry.
Thus, Edward Mason, commenting on Papendreou’s (1952) survey of
research on the behavioral theory of the firm, mused aloud:
...has the contribution of this literature to economic analysis really been a large
one? The writer of this critique must confess a lack of confidence in the marked
superiority, for purposes of economic analysis, of this newer concept of the firm,
over the older conception of the entrepreneur. (Mason, 1952, pp. 22 l-2, italics in
the original.)
And, in a similar vein, Milton Friedman sums up his celebrated polemic
against realism in theory (1953, p. 41, italics supplied):
Complete “realism” is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a theory is
realistic “enough” can be settled only be seeing whether it yields predictions that
are good enough for the purpose in hand  or that are better than predictions from
alternative theories.
The “purpose in hand” that is implicit in both of these quotations is
providing decision-theoretic foundations for positive, and then for norma-
tive political economy. In the view of Mason and Friedman, fundamental
inquiry into rational human behavior in the context of business organiza-
tions is simply not (by definition) economics - that is to say, political econo-
my - unless it contributes in a major  way to that purpose. This is sometimes
even interpreted to mean that economic theories of decision making are
not falsified in any interesting or relevant sense when their empirical
predictions of microphenomena are found to be grossly incompatible with
the observed data. Such theories, we are told, are still realistic “enough”
provided that they do not contradict aggregate observations of concern to
political economy. Thus economists who are zealous in insisting that eco-
nomic actors maximize turn around and become satisficers when the
evaluation of their own theories is concerned. They believe that business-
men maximize, but they know that economic theorists satisfice.
The application of the principle of satisficing to theories is sometimes
defended as an application of Occam’s Razor: accept the simplest theory
that works.
2 But Occam’s Razor has a double edge. Succinctness of state-
ment is not the only measure of a theory’s simplicity. Occam understood
his rule as recommending theories that make no more assumptions than
2 The phrase “that works” refutes, out of hand, Friedman’s celebrated paean of praise for
lack of realism in assumptions. Consider his example of the law of falling bodies (Friedman,
pp. 16-19). His valid point is that it is advantageous to use the simple law, ignoring air
resistance, when it gives a “good enough” approximation. But of course the conditions under
which it gives a good approximation are not at all the conditions under which it is unrealistic
or a “widely inaccurate descriptive representation of reality.” I cannot in this brief space
mention, much less discuss, all of the numerous logical fallacies that can be found in
Friedman’s 40-page essay. For additional criticism, see Simon (1962) and Samuelson (1962).346 Economic Sciences 1978
necessary to account for the phenomena (Essentia non sunt multiplicanda
praeter necessitatem). A theory of profit or utility maximization can be stated
more briefly than a satisfying theory of the sort I shall discuss later. But
the former makes much stronger assumptions than the latter about the
human cognitive system. Hence in the case before us, the two edges of the
razor cut in opposite directions.
In whichever way we interpret Occam’s principle, parsimony can be only a
secondary consideration in choosing between theories, unless those theor-
ies make identical predictions. Hence, we must come back to a consider-
ation of the phenomena that positive decision theory is supposed to han-
dle. These may include both phenomena at the microscopic level of the
decision-making agents, or aggregative phenomena of concern to political
economy.
Decision Theory Pursued for its Intrinsic Interest
Of course the definition of the word “economics” is not important. Like
Humpty Dumpty, we can make words mean anything we want them to
mean. But the professional training and range of concern of economists
does have importance. Acceptance of the narrow view that economics is
concerned only with the aggregative phenomena of political economy
defines away a whole rich domain of rational human behavior as inappro-
priate for economic research.
I do not wish to appear to be admitting that the behavioral theory of the
firm has been irrelevant to the construction of political economy. I will have
more to say about its relevance in a moment. My present argument is
counterfactual in form: even if there were no present evidence of such
relevance, human behavior in business firms constitutes a highly interest-
ing body of empirical phenomena that calls out for explanation as do all
bodies of phenomena. And if we may extrapolate from the history of the
other sciences, there is every reason to expect that as explanations emerge,
relevance for important areas of practical application will not be long
delayed.
It has sometimes been implied (Friedman, p. 14) that the correctness of
the assumptions of rational behavior underlying the classical theory of the
firm is not merely irrelevant, but is not even empirically testable in any
direct way, the only valid test being whether these assumptions lead to
tolerably correct predictions at the macroscopic level. That would be true,
of course, if we had no microscopes, so that the micro-level behavior was
not directly observable. But we do have microscopes. There are many
techniques for observing decision-making behavior, even at second-by-
second intervals if that is wanted. In testing our economic theories, we do
not have to depend on the rough aggregate times series that are the main
grist for the econometric mill, or even upon company financial statements.
The classical theories of economic decision making and of the business
firm make very specific testable predictions about the concrete behavior of
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tions. Since these predictions can be tested directly by observation, either
theory (or both) may be falsified as readily when such predictions fail as
when predictions about aggregate phenomena are in error.
Aggregative Tests of Decision Theory: Marginalism
If some economists have erroneously supposed that microeconomic theory
can only be tested by its predictions of aggregate phenomena we should
avoid the converse error of supposing that aggregate phenomena are
irrelevant to testing decision theory. In particular, are there important,
empirically verified aggregate predictions that follow from the theory of
perfect rationality but that do not follow from behavioral theories of
rationality?
The classical theory of omniscient rationality is strikingly simple and
beautiful. Moreover, it allows us to predict (correctly or not) human
behavior without stirring out of our armchairs to observe what such
behavior is like. All the predictive power comes from characterizing the
shape of the environment in which the behavior takes place. The environ-
ment, combined with the assumptions of perfect rationality, fully deter-
mines the behavior. Behavioral theories of rational choice - theories of
bounded rationality - do not have this kind of simplicity. But, by way of
compensation, their assumptions about human capabilities are far weaker
than those of the classical theory. Thus, they make modest and realistic
demands on the knowledge and computational abilities of the human
agents, but they also fail to predict that those agents will equate costs and
returns at the margin.
Have the Marginalist Predictions Been Tested?
A number of empirical phenomena have been cited as providing more or
less conclusive support for the classical theory of the firm as against its
behavioral competitors (Jorgensen and Siebert, 1968). But there are no
direct observations that individuals or firms do actually equate marginal
costs and revenues. The empirically verified consequences of the classical
theory are always weaker than this. Let us look at four of the most
important of them: the fact that demand curves generally have negative
slopes, the fact that fitted Cobb-Douglas functions are approximately ho-
mogeneous of the first degree, the fact of decreasing returns to scale, and
the fact that executive salaries vary with the logarithm of company size.
Are these indeed facts? And does the evidence support a maximizing
theory against a satisficing theory?
Negatively Sloping Demand Curves. Evidence that consumers actually dis-
tribute their purchases in such a way as to maximize their utlilities, and
hence to equate marginal utilities, is nonexistent. What the empirical data
do confirm is that demand curves generally have negative slopes. (Even
this “obvious” fact is tricky to verify, as Henry Schultz (1938) showed long
years ago.) But negatively sloping demand curves could result from a wide
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er than those of utility maximization. Gary Becker, who can scarcely be
regarded as a hostile witness for the classical theory, states the case very
well (1962, p. 4):
Economists have long been aware that some changes in the feasible or opportuni-
ty sets of households would lead to the same response regardless of the decision rule
used. For example, a decrease in real income necessarily decreases the amount
spent on at least one commodity... It has seldom been realized, however, that the
change in opportunities resulting from a change in relative prices also tends to
produce a systematic response, regardless of the decision rule. In particular, the
fundamental theorem of traditional theory - that demand curves are negatively
inclined - largely results from the change in opportunities alone and is largely
independent of the decision rule.
Later, Becker is even more explicit, saying (1962, p. 5), “Not only utility
maximization but also many other decision rules, incorporating a wide
variety of irrational behavior, lead to negatively inclined demand curves
because of the effect of a change in prices on opportunities.“
3
First-Degree Homogeneity of Production Functions. Another example of an
observed phenomenon for with the classical assumptions provide suffi-
cient, but not necessary, conditions is the equality between labor’s share of
product and the exponent of the labor factor in fitted Cobb-Douglas
production functions (Simon & Levy, 1963). Fitted Cobb-Douglas func-
tions are homogeneous, generally of degree close to unity and with a labor
exponent of about the right magnitude. These findings, however, cannot
be taken as strong evidence for the classical theory, for the identical results
can readily be produced by mistakenly fitting a Cobb-Douglas function to
data that were in fact generated by a linear accounting identity (value of
goods equals labor cost plus capital cost) (Phelps-Brown, 1957). The same
comment applies to the SMAC production function (Cyert & Simon,
1971). Hence, the empirical findings do not allow us to draw any particular
conclusions about the relative plausibility of classical and behavioral theo-
ries, both of which are equally compatible with the data.
The Long-Run Cost Curve . Somewhat different is the case of the firm’s
long-run cost curve, which classical theory requires to be U-shaped if
competitive equilibrium is to be stable. Theories of bounded rationalilty do
not predict this - fortunately, for the observed data make it exceedingly
doubtful that the cost curves are in fact generally U-shaped. The evidence
for many industries shows costs at the high-scale ends of the curves to be
essentially constant or even declining (Walters, 1963). This finding is
compatible with stochastic models of business firm growth and size (Ijiri &
Simon, 1977), but not with the static equilibrium model of classical theory.
Executive Salaries. Average salaries of top corporate executives grow with
3 In a footnote Becker indicates that he denotes as irrational “[A]ny deviation from utility
maximization.” Thus, what I have called “bounded rationality” is “irrationality” in Becker’s
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the logarithm of corporate size (Roberts, 1959). This finding has been
derived from the assumptions of the classical theory of profit maximiza-
tion only with the help of very particular ad hoc assumptions about the
distribution of managerial ability (Lucas, 1978). The observed relation is
implied by a simple behavioral theory that assumes only that there is a
single, culturally determined, parameter which fixes the average ratio of
the salaries of managers to the salaries of their immediate subordinates
(Simon, 1957). In the case of the executive salary data, the behavioral
model that explains the observations is substantially more parsimonious (in
terms of assumptions about exogenous variables) than the classical model
that explains the same observations.
Summary: Phenomena That Fail to Discriminate. It would take a much more
extensive review than is provided here to establish the point conclusively,
but I believe it is the case that specific phenomena requiring a theory of
utility or profit maximization for their explanation rather than a theory of
bounded rationality simply have not been observed in aggregate data. In
fact, as my last two examples indicate, it is the classical, rather than the
behavioral form of the theory that faces real difficulties in handling some
of the empirical observations.
Failures of Classical Theory. It may well be that classical theory can be
patched up sufficiently to handle a wide range of situations where uncer-
tainty and outguessing phenomena do not play a central role - that is, to
handle the behavior of economies that are relatively stable and not too
distant from a competitive equilibrium. However, a strong positive case for
replacing the classical theory by a model of bounded rationality begins to
emerge when we examine situations involving decision making under
uncertainty and imperfect competition. These situations the classical the-
ory was never designed to handle, and has never handled satisfactorily.
Statistical decision theory employing the idea of subjective expected utility,
on the one hand, and game theory, on the other, have contributed enor-
mous conceptual clarification to these kinds of situations without provid-
ing satisfactory descriptions of actual human behavior, or even, for most
cases, normative theories that are actually usable in the face of the limited
computational powers of men and computers.
I shall have more to say later about the positive case for a descriptive
theory of bounded rationality, but I would like to turn first to another
territory within economic science that has gained rapidly in population
since World War II, the domain of normative decision theory.
Normative Decision Theory
Decision theory can be pursued not only for the purposes of building
foundations for political economy, or of understanding and explaining
phenomena that are in themselves intrinsically interesting, but also for the
purpose of offering direct advice to business and governmental decision
makers. For reasons not clear to me, this territory was very sparsely settled
prior to World War II. Such inhabitants as it had were mainly industrial350 Economic Sciences 1978
engineers, students of public administration, and specialists in business
functions, none of whom especially identified themselves with the econom-
ic sciences. Prominent pioneers included the mathematician, Charles Bab-
bage, inventor of the digital computer, the engineer, Frederick Taylor,
and the administrator, Henri Fayol.
During World War II, this territory, almost abandoned, was redisco-
vered by scientists, mathematicians, and statisticians concerned with mili-
tary management and logistics, and was renamed “operations research” or
“operations analysis.” So remote were the operations researchers from the
social science community that economists wishing to enter the territory
had to establish their own colony, which they called “management sci-
ence.” The two professional organizations thus engendered still retain
their separate identities, though they are now amicably federated in a
number of common endeavors.
Optimization techniques were transported into management science
from economics, and new optimization techniques, notably linear pro-
gramming, were invented and developed, the names of Dantzig, Kantoro-
vich, and Koopmans being prominent in the early development of that
tool.
Now the salient characteristic of the decision tools employed in manage-
ment science is that they have to be capable of actually making or recom-
mending decisions, taking as their inputs the kinds of empirical data that
are available in the real world, and performing only such computations as
can reasonably be performed by existing desk calculators or, a little later,
electronic computers. For these domains, idealized models of optimizing
entrepreneurs, equipped with complete certainty about the world - or, at
worst, having full probability distributions for uncertain events - are of
little use. Models have to be fashioned with an eye to practical computabi-
lity, no matter how severe the approximations and simplifications that are
thereby imposed on them.
Model construction under these stringent conditions has taken two
directions. The first is to retain optimization, but to simplify sufficiently so
that the optimum (in the simplified world!) is computable. The second is to
construct satisficing models that provide good enough decisions with rea-
sonable costs of computation. By giving up optimization, a richer set of
properties of the real world can be retained in the models. Stated other-
wise, decision makers can satisfice either by finding optimum solutions for
a simplified world, or by finding satisfactory solutions for a more realistic
world. Neither approach, in general, dominates the other, and both have
continued to co-exist in the world of management science.
Thus, the body of theory that has developed in management science
shares with the body of theory in descriptive decision theory a central
concern with the ways in which decisions are made, and not just with the
decision outcomes. As I have suggested elsewhere (1978b), these are theo-
ries of how to decide rather than theories of what to decide.
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model building in normative economics is shaped by computational consid-
erations (Holt, Modigliani, Muth & Simon, 1960). In the face of uncertain
and fluctuating production demands, a company can smooth and stabilize
its production and employment levels at the cost of holding buffer inven-
tories. What kind of decision rule will secure a reasonable balance of costs?
Formally, we are faced with a dynamic programming problem, which
generally pose formidable and often intolerable computational burdens
for their solution.
One way out of this difficulty is to seek a special case of the problem that
will be computationally tractable. If we assume the cost functions facing
the company all to be quadratic in form, the optimal decision rule will then
be a linear function of the decision variables, which can readily be comput-
ed in terms of the cost parameters. Equally important, under uncertainty
about future sales, only the expected values, and not the higher moments,
of the probability distributions enter into the decision rule. Hence the
assumption of quadratic costs reduces the original problem to one that is
readily solved. Of course the solution, though it provides optimal decisions
for the simplified world of our assumptions, provides, at best, satisfactory
solutions for the real-world decision problem that the quadratic function
approximates. In-principle, unattainable optimization is sacrificed for in-
practice, attainable satisfaction.
If human decision makers are as rational as their limited computational
capabilities and their incomplete information permit them to be, then
there will be a close relation between normative and descriptive decision
theory. Both areas of inquiry are concerned primarily with procedural
rather than substantive rationality (Simon, 1978a). As new mathematical
tools for computing optimal and satisfactory decisions are discovered, and
as computers become more and more powerful, the recommendations of
normative decision theory will change. But as the new recommendations
are diffused, the actual, observed, practice of decision making in business
firms will change also. And these changes may have macroeconomic conse-
quences. For example, there is some agreement that average inventory
holdings of American firms have been reduced significantly by the intro-
duction of formal procedures for calculating reorder points and quanti-
ties.
CHARACTERIZING BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The principal forerunner of a behavioral theory of the firm is the tradition
usually called institutionalism. It is not clear that all of the writings, Euro-
pean and American, usually lumped under this rubric have much in
common, or that their authors would agree with each other’s views. At
best, they share a conviction that economic theory must be reformulated to
take account of the social and legal structures amidst which market transac-
tions are carried out. Today, we even find a vigorous development within352 Economic Sciences 1978
economics that seeks to achieve institutionalist goals within the context of
neoclassical price theory. I will have more to say about that a little later.
The name of John R. Commons is prominent - perhaps the most promi-
nent - among American Institutionalists.  Commons’ difficult writings (e.g.,
Commons, 1934) borrow their language heavily from the law, and seek to
use the transaction as their basic unit of behavior. I will not undertake to
review Commons’ ideas here, but simply remark that they provided me
with many insights in my initial studies of organizational decision making
(see Administrative Behavior, page 136).
Commons also had a substantial influence on the thinking of Chester I.
Barnard, an intellectually curious business executive who distilled from his
experience as President of the New Jersey Belt Telephone Company, and
as executive of other business, governmental, and non-profit organiza-
tions, a profound book on decision making titled The Functions of the
Executive (1938). Barnard proposed original theories, which have stood up
well under empirical scrutiny, of the nature of the authority mechanism in
organizations, and of the motivational bases for employee acceptance of
organizational goals (the so-called “inducements-contributions” theory);
and he provided a realistic description of organizational decision making,
which he characterized as “opportunistic.” The numerous references to
Barnard’s work in Administrative Behavior attest, though inadequately, to
the impact he had on my own thinking about organizations.
In Search of a Descriptive Theory
In 1934-5, in the course of a field study of the administration of public
recreational facilities in Milwaukee, which were managed jointly by the
school board and the city public works department, I encountered a
puzzling phenomenon. Although the heads of the two agencies appeared
to agree as to the objectives of the recreation program, and did not appear
to be competing for empire, yet there was continual disagreement and
tension between them with respect to the allocation of funds between
physical maintenance, on the one hand, and play supervision on the other.
Why did they not, as my economics books suggested, simply balance off
the marginal return of the one activity against that of the other?
Further exploration made it apparent that they didn’t equate expendi-
tures at the margin because, intellectually, they couldn’t. There was no
measurable production function from which quantitative inferences about
marginal productivities could be drawn; and such qualitative notions of a
production function as the two managers possessed were mutually incom-
patible. To the public works administrator, a playground was a physical
facility, serving as a green oasis in the crowded gray city. To the recreation
administrator, a playground was a social facility, where children could play
together with adult help and guidance.
How can human beings make rational decisions in circumstances like
these? How are they to apply the marginal calculus? Or, if it does not
apply, what do they substitute for it?H. A. Simon 353
The phenomenon observed in Milwaukee is ubiquitous in human deci-
sion making. In organization theory it is usually referred to as subgoal
identification. When the goals of an organization cannot be connected
operationally with actions (when the production function can’t be formu-
lated in concrete terms), then decisions will be judged against subordinate
goals that can be so connected. There is no unique determination of these
subordinate goals. Their formulation will depend on the knowledge, ex-
perience, and organizational environment of the decision maker. In the
face of this ambiguity, the formulation can also be influenced in subtle,
and not so subtle, ways by his self-interest and power drives.
The phenomenon arises as frequently in individual as in social decision
making and problem solving. Today, under the rubric of problem represen-
tation, it is a central research interest of cognitive psychology. Given a
particular environment of stimuli, and a particular background of pre-
vious knowledge, how will a person organize this complex mass of informa-
tion into a problem formulation that will facilitate his solution efforts?
How did Newton’s experience of the apple, if he had one, get represented
as an instance of attraction of apple by Earth?
Phenomena like these provided the central theme for Administrative
Behavior. That study represented “an attempt to construct tools useful in
my own research in the field of public administration.” The product was
actually not so much a theory as a prolegomena to a theory, stemming
from the conviction “that decision making is the heart of administration,
and that the vocabulary of administrative theory must be derived from the
logic and psychology of human choice.” It was, if you please, an exercise in
problem representation.
On examination, the phenomenon of subgoal identification proved to
be the visible tip of a very large iceberg. The shape of the iceberg is best
appreciated by contrasting it with classical models of rational choice. The
classical model calls for knowledge of all the alternatives that are open to
choice. It calls for complete knowledge of, or ability to compute, the
consequences that will follow on each of the alternatives. It calls for
certainty in the decision-maker’s present and future evaluation of these
consequences. It calls for the ability to compare consequences, no matter
how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some consistent measure of
utility. The task, then was to replace the classical model with one that
would describe how decisions could be (and probably actually were) made
when the alternatives of search had to be sought out, the consequences of
choosing particular alternatives were only very imperfectly known both
because of limited computational power and because of uncertainty in the
external world, and the decision maker did not possess a general and
consistent utility function for comparing heterogeneous alternatives.
Several procedures of rather general applicability and wide use have
been discovered that transform intractable decision problems into tracta-
ble ones. One procedure already mentioned is to look for satisfactory
choices instead of optimal ones. Another is to replace abstract, global goals354 Economic Sciences 1978
with tangible subgoals, whose achievement can be observed and measured.
A third is to divide up the decision-making task among many specialists,
coordinating their work by means of a structure of communications and
authority relations. All of these, and others, fit the general rubric of
“bounded rationality”, and it is now clear that the elaborate organizations
that human beings have constructed in the modern world to carry out the
work of production and government can only be understood as machinery
for coping with the limits of man’s abilities to comprehend and compute in
the face of complexity and uncertainty.
This rather vague and general initial formulation of the idea of bound-
ed rationality called for elaboration in two directions: greater formaliza-
tion of the theory, and empirical verification of its main claims. During the
decade that followed the publication of Administrative Behavior, substantial
progress was made in both directions, some of it through the efforts of my
colleagues and myself, much of it by other research groups that shared the
same Zeitgeist.
Empirical Studies
The principal source of empirical data about organizational decision mak-
ing has been straightforward “anthropological” field study, eliciting de-
scriptions of decision making procedures and observing the course of
specific decision-making episodes. Examples are a study, with Guetzkow,
Kozmetsky, and Tyndall (1954), of the ways in which accounting data were
used in decision-making in large corporations; and a series of studies, with
Cyert, March, and others, of specific non-programmed policy decisions in
a number of different companies (Cyert, Simon & Trow, 1956). The latter
line of work was greatly developed and expanded by Cyert and March and
its theoretical implications for economics explored in their important
work, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963).
At about the same time, the fortuitous availability of some data on
businessmen’s perceptions of a problem situation described in a business
policy casebook enabled Dearborn and me (1958) to demonstrate empiri-
cally the cognitive basis for identification with subgoals, the phenomenon
that had so impressed me in the Milwaukee recreation study. The business-
men’s perceptions of the principal problems facing the company described
in the case were mostly determined by their own business experiences -
sales and accounting executives identified a sales problem, manufacturing
executives, a problem of internal organization.
Of course there is vastly more to be learned and tested about organiza-
tional decision-making than can be dealt with in a handful of studies.
Although many subsequent studies have been carried out in Europe and
the United States, this domain is still grossly undercultivated (For refer-
ences, see March, 1965, Johnsen, 1968, Eliasson, 1976). Among the rea-
sons for the relative neglect of such studies, as contrasted, say, with labora-
tory experimentation in social psychology, is that they are extremely costly
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carrying them out is primitive, and satisfactory access to decision-making
behavior is hard to secure. This part of economics has not yet acquired the
habits of patience and persistence in the pursuit of facts that is exemplified
in other domains by the work, say, of Kuznetz or of the architects of the
MIT-SSRC-Pennsylvania econometric models.
Theoretical Inquiries.
On the theoretical side, three questions seemed especially to call for clarifi-
cation: what are the circumstances under which an employment relation
will be preferred to some other form of contract as the arrangement for
securing the performance of work; what is the relation between the classi-
cal theory of the firm and theories of organizational equilibrium first
proposed by C. I. Barnard; and what are the main characteristics of
human rational choice in situations where complexity precludes omni-
science?
The Employment Relation. A fundamental characteristic of modern indus-
trial society is that most work is performed, not by individuals who pro-
duce products for sale, nor by individual contractors, but by persons who
have accepted employment in a business firm and the authority relation
with the employer that employment entails. Acceptance of authority
means willingness to permit one’s behavior to be determined by the em-
ployer, at least within some zone of indifference or acceptance. What is the
advantage of this arrangement over a contract for specified goods or
services? Why is so much of the world’s work performed in large, hierar-
chic organizations?
Analysis showed (Simon,1951) that a combination of two factors could
account for preference for the employment contract over other forms of
contracts: uncertainty as to which future behaviors would be advantageous
to the employer, and a greater indifference of the employee as compared
with the employer (within the former’s area of acceptance) as to which of
these behaviors he carried out. When the secretary is hired, the employer
does not know what letters he will want her to type, and the secretary has
no great preference for typing one letter rather than another. The em-
ployment contract permits the choice to be postponed until the uncertainty
is resolved, with little cost to the employee and great advantage to the
employer. The explanation is closely analogous to one Marschak had
proposed (1949) for liquidity preference. Under conditions of uncertainty
it is advantageous to hold resources in liquid, flexible form.
Organizational Equilibrium. Barnard ( 1938) had described the survival of
organizations in terms of the motivations that make their participants
(employees, investors, customers, suppliers) willing to remain in the sys-
tem. In Administrative Behavior, I had developed this notion further into a
motivational theory of the balance between the inducements that were
provided by organizations to their participants, and the contributions
those participants made to the organizations’ resources.
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ity to the classical theory of the firm, but with an important and instructive
difference. In comparing the two theories, each inducement-contribution
relation became a supply schedule for the firm. The survival conditions
became the conditions for positive profit. But while the classical theory of
the firm assumes that all profits go to a particular set of participants, the
owners, the organization theory treats the surplus more symmetrically,
and does not predict how it will be distributed. Hence the latter theory
leaves room, under conditions of monopoly and imperfect competition,
for bargaining among the participants (e.g., between labor and owners) for
the surplus. The survival conditions - positive  profits rather than maxi-
mum profits - also permits  a departure from the assumptions of perfect
rationality.
Mechanisms of Bounded Rationality. In Administrative Behavior, bounded
rationality is largely characterized as a residual category - rationality is
bounded when it falls short of omniscience. And the failures of omni-
science are largely failures of knowing all the alternatives, uncertainty
about relevant exogenous events, and inability to calculate consequences.
There was needed a more positive and formal characterization of the
mechanisms of choice under conditions of bounded rationality. Two pa-
pers (Simon, 1955 and 1956) undertook first steps in that direction.
Two concepts are central to the characterization: search and satisficing. If
the alternatives for choice are not given initially to the decision maker,
then he must search for them. Hence, a theory of bounded rationality
must incorporate a theory of search. This idea was later developed inde-
pendently by Stigler (1961) in a very influential paper that took as its
example of a decision situation the purchase of a second-hand automobile.
Stigler poured the search theory back into the old bottle of classical utility
maximization, the cost of search being equated with its marginal return. In
my 1956 paper, I had demonstrated the same formal equivalence, using as
my example a dynamic programming formulation of the process of selling
a house.
But utility maximization, as I showed, was not essential to the search
scheme - fortunately, for it would have required the decision maker to be
able to estimate the marginal costs and returns of search in a decision
situation that was already too complex for the exercise of global rationality.
As an alternative, one could postulate that the decision maker had formed
some aspiration as to how good an alternative he should find. As soon as he
discovered an alternative for choice meeting his level of aspiration, he
would terminate the search and choose that alternative. I called this mode
of selection satisficing. It had its roots in the empirically based psychological
theories, due to Lewin and others, of aspiration levels. As psychological
inquiry had shown, aspiration levels are not static, but tend to rise and fall
in consonance with changing experiences. In a benign environment that
provides many good alternatives, aspirations rise; in a harsher environ-
ment, they fall.
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dynamically adapting aspiration levels would be equivalent to optimal
choice, taking the costs of search into account. But the important thing
about the search and satisficing theory is that it showed how choice could
actually be made with reasonable amounts of calculation, and using very
incomplete information, without the need of performing the impossible -
of carrying out this optimizing procedure.
Summary
Thus, by the middle 1950’s, a theory of bounded rationality had been
proposed as an alternative to classical omniscient rationality, a significant
number of empirical studies had been carried out that showed actual
business decision making to conform reasonably well with the assumptions
of bounded rationality but not with the assumptions of perfect rationality,
and key components of the theory - the nature of the authority and em-
ployment relations,organizational equilibrium, and the mechanisms of
search and satisficing - had been elucidated formally. In the remaining
parts of this paper, I should like to trace subsequent developments of
decision-making theory, including developments competitive with the the-
ory of bounded rationality, and then to comment on the implications (and
potential implications) of the new descriptive theory of decision for politi-
cal economy.
THE NEOCLASSICAL REVIVAL
Peering forward from the late 1950’s, it would not have been unreasonable
to predict that theories of bounded rationality would soon find a large
place in the mainstream of economic thought. Substantial progress had
been made in providing the theories with some formal structure, and an
increasing body of empirical evidence showed them to provide a far more
veridical picture of decision making in business organizations than did the
classical concepts of perfect rationality.
History has not followed any such simple course, even though many
aspects of the Zeitgeist were favorable to movement in this direction.
During and after World War II, a large number of academic economists
were exposed directly to business life, and had more or less extensive
opportunities to observe how decisions were actually made in business
organizations. Moreover, those who became active in the development of
the new management science were faced with the necessity of developing
decision-making procedures that could actually be applied in practical
situations. Surely these trends would be conducive to moving the basic
assumptions of economic rationality in the direction of greater realism.
But these were not the only things that were happening in economics in
the Postwar period. First, there was a vigorous reaction that sought to
defend classical theory from behavioralism on methodological grounds. I
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part of my talk. However deeply one may disagree with them, they were
stated persuasively and are still influential among academic economists.
Second, the rapid spread of mathematical knowledge and competence
in the economics profession permitted the classical theory, especially when
combined with statistical decision theory and the theory of games due to
von Neuman and Morgenstern, to develop to new heights of sophistication
and elegance, and to expand to embrace, albeit in highly stylized form,
some of the phenomena of uncertainty and imperfect information. The
flowering of mathematical economics and econometrics has provided two
generations of economic theorists with a vast garden of formal and techni-
cal problems that have absorbed their energies and postponed encounters
with the inelegancies of the real world.
If I sound mildly critical of these developments, I should confess that I
have also been a part of them, admire them, and would be decidedly
unhappy to return to the pre-mathematical world they have replaced. My
concern is that the economics profession has exhibited some of the serial
one-thing-at-a-time character of human rationality, and has seemed some-
times to be unable to distribute its attention in a balanced fashion among
neoclassical theory, macroeconometrics, and descriptive decision theory.
As a result, not as much professional effort has been devoted to the latter
two, and especially the third, as one might have hoped and expected. The
Heartland is more overpopulated than ever, while rich lands in other parts
of the empire go untended.
Search and Information Transfer
Let me allude to just three of the ways in which classical theory has sought
to cope with some of its traditional limitations, and has even sought to
make the development of a behavioral theory, incorporating psychological
assumptions, unnecessary. The first was to introduce search and informa-
tion transfer explicitly as economic activities, with associated costs and
outputs, that could be inserted into the classical production function. I
have already referred to Stigler’s 1961 paper on the economics of informa-
tion, and my own venture in the same direction in the 1956 essay cited
earlier.
In theory of this genre, the decision maker is still an individual. A very
important new direction, where decisions are made by groups of indivi-
duals, in teams or organizations, is the economic theory of teams devel-
oped by Jacob Marschak and Roy Radner (1972). Here we see genuine
organizational phenomena - specialization  of decision making as a conse-
quence of the costs of transmitting information - emerge from the rational
calculus. Because the mathematical difficulties are formidable, the theory
remains largely illustrative and limited to very simple situations in minia-
ture organizations. Nevertheless, it has greatly broadened our understand-
ing of the economics of information.
In none of these theories - any more than in  statistical decision theory or
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doned. Limits and costs of information are introduced, not as psychologi-
cal characteristics of the decision maker, but as part of his technological
environment. Hence, the new theories do nothing to alleviate the computa-
tional complexities facing the decision maker - do not see him  coping with
them by heroic approximation, simplifying and satisficing, but simply
magnify and multiply them. Now he needs to compute not merely the
shapes of his supply and demand curves, but the costs and benefits of
computing those shapes to greater accuracy as well. Hence, to some extent,
the impression that these new theories deal with the hitherto ignored
phenomena of uncertainty and information transmission is illusory. For
many economists, however, the illusion has been persuasive.
Rational Expectations Theory
A second development in neoclassical theory on which I wish to comment
is the so-called “rational expectations” theory. There is a bit of historical
irony surrounding its origins. I have already described the management
science inquiry of Holt, Modigliani, Muth and myself that developed a
dynamic programming algorithm for the special (and easily computed)
case of quadratic cost functions. In this case, the decision rules are linear,
and the probability distributions of future events can be replaced by their
expected values, which serve as certainty equivalents (Simon, 1956; Theil,
1957).
John F. Muth imaginatively saw in this special case a paradigm for
rational behavior under uncertainty. What to some of us in the HMMS
research team was an approximating, satisficing simplification, served for
him as a major line of defence for perfect rationality. He said in his
seminal 1961 Econometrica article (p. 316), “It is sometimes argued that the
assumption of rationality in economics leads to theories inconsistent with,
or inadequate to explain, observed phenomena, especially changes over
time . . Our hypothesis is based on exactly the opposite point of view: that
dynamic economic models do not assume enough rationality.”
The new increment of rationality that Muth proposed was that (page
316) “expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events,
are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic the-
ory.” He would cut the Gordian knot. Instead of dealing with uncertainty
by elaborating the model of the decision process, he would once and for
all - if his hypothesis were correct - make  process irrelevant. The subse-
quent vigorous development of rational expectations theory, in the hands
of Sargent, Lucas, Prescott, and others, is well known to most readers (see,
for example, Lucas, 1975).
It is too early to render a final verdict on the rational expectations
theory. The issue will ultimately be decided, as all scientific debates should
be, by a gradual winnowing of the empirical evidence, and that winnowing
process has just begun. Meanwhile, certain grave theoretical difficulties
have already been noticed. As Muth himself has pointed out, it is only
rational (i.e., profit maximizing) to use the “rational expectations” decision360 Economic Sciences 1978
rule if the relevant cost equations are in fact quadratic. I have suggested
elsewhere (Simon, 1978a) that it might therefore be less misleading to call
the rule a “consistent expectations” rule.
Perhaps even more important,Ando (1979) and Benjamin Friedman
(1978, 1979) have shown that the policy implications of the rational expec-
tations rule are quite different under conditions where new information
continually becomes available to the system, structural changes occur, and
the decision-maker learns, than they are under steady-state conditions. For
example, under the more dynamic conditions, monetary neutrality - which
generally holds for the static consistent expectations models - is no longer
guaranteed for any finite time horizon.
In the recent “revisionist” versions of consistent expectations theory,
moreover, where account is taken of a changing environment of informa-
tion, various behavioral assumptions reappear to explain how expectations
are formed - what information decision makers will consider, and what
they will ignore. But unless these assumptions are to be made on a wholly
ad hoc and arbitrary basis, they create again the need for an explicit and
valid theory of the decision-making process (Simon, 1958a, B. Friedman,
1979).
Statistical Decision Theory and Game Theory
Statistical decision theory and game theory are two other important com-
ponents of the neoclassical revival. The former addresses itself to the
question of incorporating uncertainty (or more properly, risk) into the
decision-making models. It requires heroic assumptions about the informa-
tion the decision maker has concerning the probability distributions of the
relevant variables, and simply increases by orders of magnitude the com-
putational problems he faces.
Game theory addresses itself to the “outguessing” problem that arises
whenever an economic actor takes into account the possible reactions to his
own decisions of the other actors. To my mind, the main product of the
very elegant apparatus of game theory has been to demonstrate quite
clearly that it is virtually impossible to define an unambiguous criterion of
rationality for this class of situations (or, what amounts to the same thing, a
definitive definition of the “solution” of a game). Hence, game theory has
not brought to the theories of oligopoly and imperfect competition the
relief from their contradictions and complexities that was originally hoped
for it. Rather, it has shown that these difficulties are ineradicable. We may
be able to reach consensus that a certain criterion of rationality is appropri-
ate to a particular game, but if someone challenges the consensus, prefer-
ring a different criterion, we will have no logical basis for persuading him
that he is wrong.
Conclusion
Perhaps I have said enough about the neoclassical revival to suggest why it
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theories. To some economists at least, it has held open the possibility and
hope that important questions that had been troublesome for classical
economics could now be addressed without sacrifice of the central assump-
tion of perfect rationality, and hence also with a maximum of a priori
inference and a minimum of tiresome grubbing with empirical data. I have
perhaps said enough also with respect to the limitations of these new
constructs to indicate why I do not believe that they solve the problems that
motivated their development.
ADVANCES IN THE BEHAVIORAL THEORY
Although they have played a muted role in the total economic research
activity during the past two decades, theories of bounded rationality and
the behavioral theory of the business firm have undergone steady develop-
ment during that period. Since surveying the whole body of work would be
a major undertaking, I shall have to be satisfied here with suggesting the
flavor of the whole by citing a few samples of different kinds of important
research falling in this domain. Where surveys on particular topics have
been published, I will limit myself to references to them.
First, there has been work in the psychological laboratory and the field
to test whether people in relatively simple choice situations behave as
statistical decision theory (maximization of expected utilities) says they do.
Second, there has been extensive psychological research, in which Allen
Newell and I have been heavily involved, to discover the actual micropro-
cesses of human decision making and problem solving. Third, there have
been numerous empirical observations - most of them in the form  of “case
studies”- of the actual processes of decision making in organizational and
business contexts. Fourth, there have been reformulations and extensions
of the theory of the firm replacing classical maximization with behavioral
decision postulates.
Utility Theory and Human Choice
The axiomatization of utility and probability after World War II and the
revival of Bayesian statistics opened the way to testing empirically whether
people behaved in choice situations so as to maximize subjective expected
utility (SEU). In early studies, using extremely simple choice situations, it
appeared that perhaps they did. When even small complications were
introduced into the situations, wide departures of behavior from the
predictions of SEU theory soon became evident. Some of the most dramat-
ic and convincing empirical refutations of the theory have been reported
by Kahneman and Tversky (1972), who showed that under one set of
circumstances, decision makers gave far too little weight to prior knowl-
edge and based their choices almost entirely on new evidence, while in
other circumstances new evidence had little influence on opinions already
formed. Equally large and striking departures from the behavior predict-
ed by the SEU theory were found by Kunreuther and his colleagues (1978)362 Economic Sciences 1978
in their studies of individual decisions to purchase or not to purchase flood
insurance. On the basis of these and other pieces of evidence, the conclu-
sion seems unavoidable that the SEU theory does not provide a good
prediction - not even a good approximation - of actual behavior.
Notice that the refutation of the theory has to do with the substance of the
decisions, and not just the process by which they are reached. It is not that
people do not go through the calculations that would be required to reach
the SEU decision - neoclassical thought has never claimed that they did.
What has been shown is that they do not even behave as if they had carried
out those calculations, and that result is a direct refutation of the neoclassi-
cal assumptions.
Psychology of Problem Solving
The evidence on rational decision making is largely negative evidence,
evidence of what people do not do. In the past twenty years a large body of
positive evidence has also accumulated about the processes that people use
to make difficult decisions and solve complex problems. The body of
theory that has been built up around this evidence is called information
processing psychology, and is usually expressed formally in computer
programming languages. Allen Newell and I have summed up our own
version of this theory in our book, Human Problem Solving (1972), which is
part of a large and rapidly growing literature that assumes an information
processing framework and makes use of computer simulation as a central
tool for expressing and testing theories.
Information processing theories envisage problem solving as involving
very selective search through problem spaces that are often immense.
Selectivity, based on rules of thumb or “heuristics”, tends to guide the
search into promising regions, so that solutions will generally be found
after search of only a tiny part of the total space. Satisficing criteria
terminate search when satisfactory problem solutions have been found.
Thus, these theories of problem solving clearly fit within the framework of
bounded rationality that I have been expounding here.
By now the empirical evidence for this general picture of the problem
solving process is extensive.Most of the evidence pertains to relatively
simple, puzzle-like situations of the sort that can be brought into the
psychological laboratory for controlled study, but a great deal has been
learned, also, about professional-level human tasks like making medical
diagnoses, investing in portfolios of stocks and bonds, and playing chess.
In tasks of these kinds, the general search mechanisms operate in a rich
context of information stored in human long-term memory, but the gener-
al organization of the process is substantially the same as for the simpler,
more specific tasks.
At the present time, research in information-processing psychology is
proceeding in several directions. Exploration of professional-level skills
continues. A good deal of effort is now being devoted also to determining
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problem domains, the problem solver has much latitude in the way he
formulates the problem space in which he will search, a finding that
underlines again how far the actual process is from a search for a uniquely
determined optimum (Hayes & Simon, 1974).
The main import for economic theory of the research in information
processing psychology is to provide rather conclusive empirical evidence
that the decision-making process in problem situations conforms closely to
the models of bounded rationality described earlier. This finding implies,
in turn, that choice is not determined uniquely by the objective characteris-
tics of the problem situation, but depends also on the particular heuristic
process that is used to reach the decision. It would appear, therefore, that
a model of process is an essential component in any positive theory of
decision making that purports to describe the real world, and that the
neoclassical ambition of avoiding the necessity for such a model is unrealiz-
able (Simon, 1978a).
Organizational Decision Making
It would be desirable to have, in addition to the evidence from the psycho-
logical research just described, empirical studies of the process of decision
making in organizational contexts. The studies of individual problem
solving and decision making do not touch on the many social-psychological
factors that enter into the decision process in organizations. A substantial
number of investigations have been carried out in the past twenty years of
the decision-making process in organizations, but they are not easily sum-
marized. The difficulty is that most of these investigations have taken the
form of case studies of specific decisions or particular classes of decisions
in individual organizations. To the best of my knowledge, no good review
of this literature has been published, so that it is difficult even to locate and
identify the studies that have been carried out.
4 
 Nor have any systematic
methods been developed and tested for distilling out from these individual
case studies their implications for the general theory of the decision-
making process.
The case studies of organizational decision making, therefore, represent
the natural history stage of scientific inquiry. They provide us with a
multitude of facts about the decision-making process - facts that are almost
uniformly consistent with the kind of behavioral model that has been
proposed here. But we do not yet know how to use these facts to test the
model in any formal way. Nor do we quite know what to do with the
observation that the specific decision-making procedures used by organiza-
tions differ from one organization to another, and within each organiza-
tion, even from one situation to another. We must not expect from these
4 For leads into the literature, see March & Simon, 1958; March, 1965; Johnsen, 1968, and
Dutton & Starbuck, 197 1. However, there are large numbers of specific case studies, some of
them carried out as thesis projects, some concerned with particular fields of business applica-
tion, which have never been recorded in these reference sources (e.g., Eliasson, 1976).364 Economic Sciences 1978
data generalizations as neat and precise as those incorporated in neoclassi-
cal theory.
Perhaps the closest approach to a method for extracting theoretically
relevant information from case studies is computer simulation. By convert-
ing empirical evidence about a decision-making process into a computer
program, a path is opened both for testing the adequacy of the program
mechanisms for explaining the data, and for discovering the key features
of the program that account, qualitatively, for the interesting and impor-
tant characteristics of its behavior. Examples of the use of this technique
are Clarkson’s (1963) simulation of the decision making of an investment
trust officer, Cyert, Feigenbaum and March’s (1959) simulation of the
history of a duopoly, and Bonini’s (1963) model of the effects of account-
ing information and supervisory pressures in altering employee motiva-
tions in a business firm. The simulation methodology is discussed from a
variety of viewpoints in Dutton & Starbuck (1971).
5
Theories of the Business Firm
The general features of bounded rationality - selective search, satisficing,
and so on - have been taken  as the starting points for a number of attempts
to build theories of the business firm incorporating behavioral assump-
tions. Examples of such theories would include the theory of Cyert and
March (1963), already mentioned; Baumol’s (1959) theory of sales maximi-
zation subject to minimum profit constraints; Marris’s (1964) models of
firms whose goals are stated in terms of rates of growth; Leibenstein’s
(1976) theory of “X-inefficiency” that depresses production below the
theoretically attainable; Kornai’s (1971) dichotomy between supply-driven
and demand-driven management; Williamson’s (1975) theory of transac-
tional costs; the evolutionary models of Nelson and Winter (1973); Cyert
and DeGroot’s (1974) models incorporating adaptive learning; Radner’s
(1975a, 1975b) explicit satisficing models; and others.
Characterized in this way, there seems to be little commonality among all
of these theories and models, except that they depart in one way or
another from the classical assumption of perfect rationality in firm deci-
sion making. A closer look, however, and a more abstract description of
their assumptions, shows that they share several basic characteristics. Most
of them depart from the assumption of profit maximization in the short
run, and replace it with an assumption of goals defined in terms of
targets - that is, they are  to greater or lesser degree satisficing theories. If
they do retain maximizing assumptions, they contain some kind of mecha-
nism that prevents the maximum from being attained, at least in the short
5 In addition to simulations of the firm, there are very interesting and potentially important
efforts to use simulation to build bridges directly from decision theory to political economy.
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run. In the Cyert-March theory, and that of Leibenstein, this mechanism
can be viewed as producing “organizational slack,” the magnitude of which
may itself be a function of motivational and environmental variables.
Finally, a number of these theories assume that organizational learning
takes place, so that if the environment were stationary for a sufficient
length of time, the system equilibrium would approach closer and closer to
the classical profit-maximizing equilibrium. Of course they generally also
assume that the environmental disturbances will generally be large enough
to prevent the classical solution from being an adequate approximation to
the actual behavior.
The presence of something like “organizational slack” in a model of the
business firm introduces complexity in the firm’s behavior in the short
run. Since the firm may operate very far from any optimum, the slack
serves as a buffer between the environment and the firm’s decisions.
Responses to environmental events can no longer be predicted simply by
analysing the “requirements of the situation,” but depend on the specific
decision processes that the firm employs. However well this characteristic
of a business firm model corresponds to reality, it reduces the attractive-
ness of the model for many economists, who are reluctant to give up the
process-independent predictions of classical theory, and who do not feel at
home with the kind of empirical investigation that is required for disclos-
ing actual real-world decision processes.
But there is another side to the matter. If, in the face of identical
environmental conditions, different decision mechanisms can produce
different firm behaviors, this sensitivity of outcomes to process can have
important consequences for analysis at the level of markets and the econo-
my. Political economy, whether descriptive or normative, cannot remain
indifferent to this source of variability in response. At the very least it
demands that - before we draw  policy conclusions from our theories, and
particularly before we act on those policy conclusions - we carry out sensi-
tivity analyses to test how far our conclusions would be changed if we made
different assumptions about the decision mechanisms at the micro-level.
If our conclusions are robust - if they are not  changed materially by
substituting one or another variant of the behavioral model for the classi-
cal model - we will gain  confidence in our predictions and recommenda-
tions; if the conclusions are sensitive to such substitutions, we will use them
warily until we can determine which microtheory is the correct one.
As reference to the literature cited earlier in this section will verify, our
predictions of the operations of markets and of the economy are sensitive
to our assumptions about mechanisms at the level of decision processes.
Moreover, the assumptions of the behavioral theories are almost certainly
closer to reality than those of the classical theory. These two facts, in
combination, constitute a direct refutation of the argument that the unrea-
lism of the assumptions of the classical theory is harmless. We cannot use
the in vacua  version of the law of falling bodies to predict the sinking of a
heavy body in molasses. The predictions of the classical and neoclassical366 Economic Sciences 1978
theories and the policy recommendations derived from them must be
treated with the greatest caution.
CONCLUSION
There is a saying in politics that “you can’t beat something with nothing.”
You can’t defeat a measure or a candidate simply by pointing to defects
and inadequacies. You must offer an alternative.
The same principle applies to scientific theory. Once a theory is well
entrenched, it will survive many assaults of empirical evidence that pur-
ports to refute it unless an alternative theory, consistent with the evidence,
stands ready to replace it. Such conservative protectiveness of established
beliefs is, indeed, not unreasonable. In the first place, in empirical science
we aspire only to approximate truths; we are under no illusion that we can
find a single simple formula, or even a moderately complex one, that
captures the whole truth and nothing else. We are committed to a strategy
of successive approximations, and when we find discrepancies between
theory and data, our first impulse is to patch rather than to rebuild from
the foundations.
In the second place, when discrepancies appear, it is seldom immediate-
ly obvious where the trouble lies. It may be located in the fundamental
assumptions of the theory, but it may as well be merely a defect in the
auxiliary hypotheses and measurement postulates we have had to assume
in order to connect theory with observations. Revisions in these latter parts
of the structure may be sufficient to save the remainder.
What then is the present status of the theory of the firm? There can no
longer be any doubt that the microassumptions of the theory - the assump-
tions of perfect rationality - are contrary to fact.  It is not a question of
approximation; they do not even remotely describe the processes that
human beings use for making decisions in complex situations.
Moreover, there is an alternative. If anything, there is an embarrassing
richness of alternatives. Today, we have a large mass of descriptive data,
from both laboratory and field, that show how human problem solving
and decision making actually take place in a wide variety of situations. A
number of theories have been constructed to account for these data, and
while these theories certainly do not yet constitute a single coherent whole,
there is much in common among them. In one way or another, they
incorporate the notions of bounded rationality: the need to search for
decision alternatives, the replacement of optimization by targets and satis-
ficing goals, and mechanisms of learning and adaptation. If our interest
lies in descriptive decision theory (or even normative decision theory), it is
now entirely clear that the classical and neoclassical theories have been
replaced by a superior alternative that provides us with a much closer
approximation to what is actually going on.
But what if our interest lies primarily in normative political economy
rather than in the more remote regions of the economic sciences? Is thereH. A. Simon 367
then any reason why we should give up the familiar theories? Have the
newer concepts of decision making and the firm shown their superiority
“for purposes of economic analysis?”
If the classical and neoclassical theories were, as is sometimes argued,
simply powerful tools for deriving aggregative consequences that held
alike for both perfect and bounded rationality, we would have every
reason to retain them for this purpose. But we have seen, on the contrary,
that neoclassical theory does not always lead to the same conclusions at the
level of aggregate phenomena and policy as are implied by the postulate of
bounded rationality, in any of its variants. Hence, we cannot defend an
uncritical use of these contrary-to-fact assumptions by the argument that
their veridicality is unimportant. In many cases, in fact, this veridicality
may be crucial to reaching correct conclusions about the central questions
of political economy. Only a comparison of predictions can tell us whether
a case before us is one of these.
The social sciences have been accustomed to look for models in the most
spectacular successes of the natural sciences. There is no harm in that,
provided that it is not done in a spirit of slavish imitation. In economics, it
has been common enough to admire Newtonian mechanics (or, as we have
seen, the Law of Falling Bodies), and to search for the economic equivalent
of the laws of motion. But this is not the only model for a science, and it
seems, indeed, not to be the right one for our purposes.
Human behavior, even rational human behavior, is not to be accounted
for by a handful of invariants. It is certainly not to be accounted for by
assuming perfect adaptation to the environment. Its basic mechanisms
may be relatively simple, and I believe they are, but that simplicity operates
in interaction with extremely complex boundary conditions imposed by
the environment and by the very facts of human long-term memory and of
the capacity of human beings, individually and collectively, to learn.
If we wish to be guided by a natural science metaphor, I suggest one
drawn from biology rather than physics (Newell & Simon, 1976). Obvious
lessons are to be learned from evolutionary biology, and rather less obvi-
ous ones from molecular biology. From molecular biology, in particular,
we can glimpse a picture of how a few basic mechanisms - the DNA of the
Double Helix, for example, or the energy transfer mechanisms elucidated
so elegantly by Professor Mitchell - can account  for a wide range of com-
plex phenomena. We can see the role in science of laws of qualitative
structure, and the power of qualitative, as well as quantitative explanation.
I am always reluctant to end a talk about the sciences of man in the
future tense. It conveys too much the impression that these are potential
sciences which may some day be actualized, but that do not really exist at
the present time. Of course that is not the case at all. However much our
knowledge of human behavior falls short of our need for such knowledge,
still it is enormous. Sometimes we tend to discount it, because so many of
the phenomena are accessible to us in the very activity of living as human
beings among human beings that it seems commonplace to us. Moreover,368 Economic Sciences 1978
it does not always answer the questions for which we need answers. We
cannot predict very well the course of the business cycle nor manage the
employment rate. (We cannot, it might be added, predict very well the
time of the next thunderstorm in Stockholm, or manage the earth’s cli-
mates.)
With all these qualifications and reservations, we do understand today
many of the mechanisms of human rational choice. We do know how the
information processing system called Man, faced with complexity beyond
his ken, uses his information processing capacities to seek out alternatives,
to calculate consequences, to resolve uncertainties, and thereby - some-
times, not always - to find ways  of action that are sufficient unto the day,
that satisfice.H. A. Simon 369
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